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Police Questioning in the Charter 
Era: Adjudicative versus Regulatory 




Perhaps no aspect of Charter1-era criminal procedure jurisprudence 
has come under more vociferous attack than the courts’ use of the 
common law to create new powers for police. Over the past 30 years, the 
“ancillary powers” doctrine has filled gaps in the legislative armoury of 
investigative powers, mostly in the areas of detention and arrest (herein-
after “detention”) and search and seizure (hereinafter “search”).2 The 
chief message of the doctrine’s critics is that courts should stick to the 
job that they are institutionally best suited to: protecting individual rights 
by ensuring that legislation and legislatively sanctioned executive action 
conforms to the minimum standards set out in the Charter.3 
There is one area of constitutional criminal procedure, however, that 
has remained untouched by both the ancillary powers doctrine and 
(necessarily) its critics: police questioning. The reason for this is that 
                                                                                                             
 Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. Thanks to Evan McIntyre and Nicholas 
Trofimuk for excellent research assistance. 
1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 See, generally, Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal 
Procedure in Canada (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2011), at paras. 1.216-1.227 [hereinafter 
“Penney, Rondinelli & Stribopoulos”]. 
3 See R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, at paras. 2-17 (S.C.C.), 
LeBel J., dissenting; James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police 
Powers and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1, at 18-30, 55-61 [hereinafter “Stribopoulos, ‘In 
Search of Dialogue’”]; James Stribopoulos, “The Limits of Judicially Created Police Powers: 
Investigative Detention After Mann” (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 299, at 314-24 [hereinafter “Stribopou-
los, ‘Limits’”]; Glen Luther, “Police Power and The Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Creation or 
Control” (1986) 51 Sask. L. Rev. 117, at 222-27; Tim Quigley, “Brief Investigatory Detentions: A 
Critique of R. v. Simpson” (2004) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 935, at 949-50. 
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neither Parliament nor the courts have given police a “power” to ques-
tion. Instead, they have merely a “freedom” to do so; people approached 
or detained by police are accordingly entitled to choose whether and how 
to answer.4 In this, the law of police questioning differs from that of 
detention and search, where (subject to limitations) police are empow-
ered to compel cooperation, either through physical force5 or legal 
sanction.6 
This does not mean, of course, that there is no need to regulate police 
questioning. Using their physical and psychological advantages over 
criminal suspects, police sometimes question them in undesirable ways, 
including those that are inherently cruel, compel unfair self-incrimination 
or induce false confessions.7 The law therefore limits the ways in which 
police are permitted to persuade suspects to speak to them. 
The same issue raised in the ancillary powers debate — the merits 
and demerits of legislative versus judicial rule-making — is thus poten-
tially in play for police questioning. As with detention and search, there 
could be a vigorous conversation on the proper functions of the common 
law, ordinary legislation, and the Charter in regulating police question-
ing. However, one of the parties to that conversation — Parliament — 
has been almost entirely silent. With the exception of the questioning of 
young persons,8 Parliament has declined to legislate on the topic, leaving 
the courts as the sole regulators of police questioning practices. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of this legis-
lative absence. The first question addressed is whether the critics of the 
ancillary powers doctrine are correct that the optimal regulation of police 
investigative practices requires robust legislative input. I argue that they 
are. Second, I ask whether courts could effectively compel Parliament to 
regulate police questioning. I argue that this is improbable. Lastly, I 
                                                                                                             
4 See, generally, Ed Ratushny, Self-incrimination in the Canadian Criminal Process (To-
ronto: Carswell, 1979), at 185-86 [hereinafter “Ratushny”]; R. v. Singh, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48, [2007] 
3 S.C.R. 405, at paras. 27-28 (S.C.C.); R. v. Turcotte, [2005] S.C.J. No. 51, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 519, at 
para. 41 (S.C.C.); R. v. Rothman, [1981] S.C.J. No. 55, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 683 (S.C.C.). 
5 See, e.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 25; R. v. Asante-Mensah, [2003] S.C.J. 
No. 38, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
6 See, e.g., Criminal Code, s. 254(5); Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 198, s. 189(1); 
Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6, s. 166. 
7 See, generally, Christopher Sherrin, “False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian 
Law” (2005) 30 Queen’s L.J. 601 [hereinafter “Sherrin”]; Steven Penney, “What’s Wrong with Self-
Incrimination? The Wayward Path of Self-Incrimination Law in the Post-Charter Era, Part 2: Self-
Incrimination in Police Investigations” (2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 280 [hereinafter “Penney, ‘What’s 
Wrong?’”]; Timothy E. Moore & C. Lindsay Fitzsimmons, “Justice Imperiled: False Confessions 
and the Reid Technique” (2011) 57 Crim. L.Q. 509 [hereinafter “Moore & Fitzsimmons”]. 
8 Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1, s. 146(1). 
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explore whether appellate courts should compensate for legislative 
silence by adopting a more robustly “regulatory” (as opposed to “adjudi-
cative”) approach to decision-making. I argue that they should and 
provide examples (under the common law confessions rule and section 
10(b) of the Charter) of how such an approach could better address the 
chief policy issue raised by police questioning: false confessions. 
II. PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN REGULATING INVESTIGATIVE 
METHODS: WHAT HAS IT BEEN? 
Before discussing the optimal relationship between Parliament and 
the courts in regulating investigative powers, it will be helpful to briefly 
describe the history of that relationship. Before the enactment of the 
Charter in 1982, neither Parliament nor the courts were active in the 
field.9 Section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 186710 gives Parliament 
exclusive authority over matters of “Criminal Procedure”, which in-
cludes the investigative phase of the criminal process. Parliament has 
never enacted a comprehensive code of criminal procedure, however, and 
its footprint on the investigative phase is small.11 
This was especially true in the pre-Charter era. During that period, 
Parliament codified common law arrest powers,12 created several search 
powers,13 regulated the questioning of young persons,14 and enacted a 
                                                                                                             
9 As a law school subject and field of practice, pre-Charter “criminal procedure” consisted 
largely of the law relating to the post-investigative phases of the criminal process. A glance at the 
leading contemporary texts reveals there was little law regulating the investigative phase. See, e.g., 
Roger E. Salhany, Canadian Criminal Procedure, 3d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1978) 
(1 chapter of 10); Eugene G. Ewaschuk, Criminal Pleadings and Practice in Canada (Toronto: 
Canada Law Book, 1983) (3 chapters of 25). 
10 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.). 
11 Provincial legislatures have also given police investigative powers under various provin-
cial heads of power that may be used in criminal inquiries in some circumstances. See, generally, R. 
v. Nolet, [2010] S.C.J. No. 24, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 851 (S.C.C.); R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias, [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); Brown v. Durham Regional Police Force, [1998] O.J. No. 
5274, 43 O.R. (3d) 223 (Ont. C.A.). The same is true of investigative powers enacted under federal 
regulatory legislation (i.e., legislation enacted under federal heads of power other than s. 91(27) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867, id. See generally R. v. Jarvis, [2002] S.C.J. No. 76, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757 
(S.C.C.). 
12 Criminal Code, 1892 (U.K.), 55 & 56 Vict., c. 29, s. 552 (see now Criminal Code, R.S.C. 
1985, c. C-46, s. 495). 
13 See, e.g., Criminal Code, 1892, id., s. 569 (search warrants for “building, receptacle or 
place”) (see now Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 487); Opium and Drug Act, S.C. 1911, 
c. 17, s. 7 (search powers in relation to drugs) (see now Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 
1996, c. 19, s. 11); Protection of Privacy Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 50 (wiretap authorizations) (see now 
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Part VI). 
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Bill of Rights15 granting individuals certain rights in relation to detention, 
search and questioning. The effect of these laws in regulating police was 
limited, however. The reasons for this are well known. First, many of the 
rules were defined by Parliament16 or interpreted by the courts17 to 
maintain maximal police discretion. Second, people affected by rule 
violations rarely had access to effective remedies.18 With few excep-
tions,19 there were no statutory powers to exclude illegally obtained 
evidence, and the Supreme Court of Canada was virtually alone in the 
common law world in refusing to recognize a common law discretion to 
exclude illegally obtained evidence.20 In addition, while the principle of 
legality held police accountable for misconduct amounting to a tort or 
crime, lawsuits and criminal prosecutions were rare.21 
The courts did little to fill the gaps. They had recognized a common 
law police power to search incident to arrest.22 And in a case arising 
shortly before the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a 
new common law power to detain motorists to investigate impaired 
                                                                                                             
14 Young Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, s. 56; see now Youth Criminal Justice Act, 
S.C. 2002, c. 1, s. 146. 
15 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, R.S.C. 1985, App. III [hereinafter “Bill of 
Rights”]. 
16 See, e.g., Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1, s. 10 (warrantless searches for drugs 
and searches for drugs under writs of assistance). See also R. v. Grant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 98, [1993] 
3 S.C.R. 223 (S.C.C.) (warrantless searches under s. 10 of Narcotic Control Act violate s. 8 of 
Charter absent exigent circumstances); R. v. Sieben, [1987] S.C.J. No. 11, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 295 
(S.C.C.) (assuming that writs of assistance violate s. 8 of the Charter). 
17 See, e.g., R. v. Chromiak, [1979] S.C.J. No. 116, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471 (S.C.C.) (right to 
counsel triggered by “detention”, which consists only of actual physical restraint). See, generally, 
Walter Surma Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights, 2d ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 
1975). 
18 See R. v. Hogan, [1974] S.C.J. No. 116, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574, at 584 (S.C.C.) (no exclu-
sion of evidence for violations of Bill of Rights). 
19 See, e.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 178.16(1) (exclusion of illegally 
obtained wiretap evidence). 
20 See Quebec (Attorney General) v. Begin, [1955] S.C.J. No. 37, [1955] S.C.R. 593 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Wray, [1970] S.C.J. No. 80, [1971] S.C.R. 272, at 293 (S.C.C.). See also Steven 
Penney, “Unreal Distinctions: The Exclusion of Unfairly Obtained Evidence Under Section 24(2) of 
the Charter” (1994) 32 Alta. L. Rev. 782, at 784-93. 
21 See Paul C. Weiler, “The Control of Police Arrest Practices: Reflections of a Tort Law-
yer” in Allen M. Linden, ed., Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1968) 416, at 
448-49; Andrew Goldsmith, “Necessary But Not Sufficient: The Role of Public Complaints 
Procedures in Police Accountability” in Philip C. Stenning, ed., Accountability for Criminal Justice: 
Selected Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) 110, at 124. 
22 Until quite recently, however, the contours of this power were vague. See Cloutier v. 
Langlois, [1990] S.C.J. No. 10, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. 
No. 34, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.); R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, 159 
C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.). 
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driving offences.23 Lastly, as in other common law jurisdictions, Cana-
dian courts had for many decades indirectly regulated interrogation 
practices by excluding involuntary confessions.24 
Police therefore had a largely free hand to do their jobs as they saw 
fit. Professional and other non-legal norms were undoubtedly influential 
in restraining misconduct. Abuses were frequent enough, however, that 
advocacy groups pressured the federal government to ensure that the 
Charter included robust checks on police discretion.25 These efforts 
helped shape the final versions of sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Charter 
(which set out the main constitutional rules regulating search, detention 
and questioning, respectively) as well as section 24 (which gave courts 
the power to award meaningful remedies for constitutional violations, 
including the exclusion of evidence).26 Like most other Charter rights, 
these provisions were articulated in broad terms. 
At the dawn of the Charter era, there were thus three sources of legal 
rules regulating police investigations: a patchwork of statutory provi-
sions, a handful of common law rules, and the new constitutional rights 
guarantees and remedial provisions. From this mix emerged a new, 
constitutionalized criminal procedure that increasingly regulated a 
greater and greater proportion of the field, much as in the United States 
after the Warren Court’s “due process revolution” in the 1960s.27 And as 
in the United States, in Canada the courts were (and remain) the chief 
architects of this revolution, interpreting the Charter “purposively” to: 
create rules directly regulating police investigations; strike down or 
temper statutory police powers; and shape the contours of both estab-
lished and novel common law police powers. 
Parliament’s role in the Charter-era has been mostly secondary, reac-
tive and deferential. It did not use the opportunity of the Charter’s 
                                                                                                             
23 R. v. Dedman, [1985] S.C.J. No. 45, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.). 
24 See R. v. Boudreau, [1949] S.C.J. No. 10, [1949] S.C.R. 262 (S.C.C.), per Rand J.; R. v. 
Fitton, [1956] S.C.J. No. 70, [1956] S.C.R. 958 (S.C.C.); R. v. Rothman, [1981] S.C.J. No. 55, 
[1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, at 644 (S.C.C.). The rule is most often traced to R. v. Warickshall (1783), 1 
Leach. 262, 168 E.R. 234 (K.B.). Its definitive, traditional formulation was set out in Ibrahim v. R., 
[1914] A.C. 599, at 609 (P.C.). 
25 See, e.g., Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee 
of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 1:7 (November 18, 
1980), at 11-12, 15-16, 27-29 (Canadian Civil Liberties Association); 1:7, at 89-90, 92 (November 
18, 1980) (Canadian Jewish Congress); and 1:15, at 8, 15, 18 (November 28, 1980) (Canadian Bar 
Association). 
26 See, generally, Anne F. Bayefsky, Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A 
Documentary History, vol. 2 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1989), at 771. 
27 See Yale Kamisar, “The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retros-
pective” (1995) 31 Tulsa L.J. 1, at 2-3. 
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passage to codify or reform the law regulating criminal investigations. Its 
chief involvement has been to give police powers to use investigative 
techniques that courts had invalidated under the Charter.28 In the main, 
these powers hewed closely to the constitutional limits dictated by the 
courts.29 In short, if the relationship between Parliament and the courts in 
this field can be characterized as a constitutional “dialogue”,30 it is one 
dominated by the latter party. 
Nor did Parliament take up the opportunity to engage the courts in a 
non-constitutional dialogue about police powers. As mentioned, the 
courts had occasionally recognized common law police powers before 
the Charter. This happened only rarely, however, and in the early years of 
the Charter the Supreme Court of Canada questioned the legitimacy of 
the practice.31 That reluctance began to fade with the widespread recog-
                                                                                                             
28 See, e.g., An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act 
and the Radiocommunication Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 4 (see now Criminal Code, ss. 184.1-184.2 
(responding to R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) and R. v. Wiggins, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 3, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62 (S.C.C.)); An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Crown 
Liability and Proceedings Act and the Radiocommunication Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 15 (see now 
Criminal Code, s. 487.01 (responding to R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 
(S.C.C.)); An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act and the 
Radiocommunication Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 18 (see now Criminal Code, s. 492.1 (responding to R. 
v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.)); An Act to Amend the Criminal Code 
(organized crime and protection of justice system participants), S.C. 1997, c. 23, s. 14 (see now 
Criminal Code, s. 487.3 (responding to R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 
(S.C.C.)); An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Young Offenders Act (forensic DNA analysis), 
S.C. 1995, c. 27, s. 1 (see now Criminal Code, ss. 487.04-.05 (responding to R. v. Borden, [1994] 
S.C.J. No. 82, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.)); DNA Identification Act, S.C. 1998, c. 37 (see now 
Criminal Code, s. 487.091 (responding to R. v. Stillman, supra, note 22); Criminal Law Improve-
ment Act, 1996, S.C. 1997, c. 18, s. 46 (see now Criminal Code, s. 487.11 (responding to R. v. 
Grant, supra, note 16 and R. v. Silveira, [1992] S.C.J. No. 38, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.)). 
Parliament did act independently in creating new search powers in specialized contexts. See, 
e.g., An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (capital markets fraud and evidence-gathering), S.C. 2004, 
c. 3, s. 7 (see now Criminal Code, ss. 487.011-487.017 (general production orders and production 
orders for financial information)); An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Crown Liability and 
Proceedings Act and the Radiocommunication Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 18 (see now Criminal Code, 
s. 492.2 (number recorder warrants)); An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Food and Drugs Act 
and the Narcotic Control Act, S.C. 1988, c. 51 (see now s. 462.32 (warrants for proceeds of crime)). 
29 See Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 3, at 66-73; Kent Roach, The 
Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), at 
176-79 [hereinafter “Roach, Supreme Court”]. 
30 See, generally, Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between 
Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 
35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75; Roach, Supreme Court, id.; Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, id., at 
61-73. 
31 See, e.g., R. v. Wong, supra, note 28, at 56 (“it does not sit well for the courts, as the 
protectors of our fundamental rights, to widen the possibility of encroachments on these personal 
liberties. It falls to Parliament to make incursions on fundamental rights if it is of the view that they 
are needed for the protection of the public in a properly balanced system of criminal justice”.). 
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nition by provincial courts of appeal of the common law power of 
investigative detention.32 That power was finally confirmed by the 
Supreme Court in 2004,33 and within a few years the Court had recog-
nized a suite of common law detention and search powers.34 Without 
exception, Parliament chose to leave these powers alone. 
III. PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN REGULATING INVESTIGATIVE 
METHODS: WHAT SHOULD IT BE? 
The next question is whether Parliament should be playing a more 
active role in regulating criminal investigations. There are at least three 
arguments in favour of greater legislative input. First, compared to 
courts, legislatures are more directly responsive to people’s preferences 
for alternative policy choices. There are of course downsides to prefer-
ence aggregation,35 and public choice theory teaches that the outcomes of 
the democratic process are often skewed in favour of motivated and 
powerful coalitions.36 But these flaws may be offset (to some degree at 
least) by the courts’ counter-majoritarian role in constitutional rights 
protection.37 
                                                                                                             
32 See R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Ferris, 
[1998] B.C.J. No. 1415, 126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1998] S.C.C.A. 
No. 424 (S.C.C.); R. v. Dupuis, [1994] A.J. No. 1011, 162 A.R. 197 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Lake, [1996] 
S.J. No. 886, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 208 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. G. (C.M.), [1996] M.J. No. 428, 113 Man. R. 
(2d) 76 (Man. C.A.); R. c. Pigeon, [1993] J.Q. no 1683, 59 Q.A.C. 103 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Carson, 
[1998] N.B.J. No. 482, 39 M.V.R. (3d) 55 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. Chabot, [1993] N.S.J. No. 465, 86 
C.C.C. (3d) 309 (N.S.C.A.); R. v. Burke, [1997] N.J. No. 187, 118 C.C.C. (3d) 59 (Nfld. C.A.). 
33 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.). 
34 See R. v. Godoy, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.) (emergency search 
power); R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.) (investigative roadblock); 
R. v. Kang-Brown, supra, note 3 (canine sniff search); R. v. M. (A.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 19, [2008] 1 
S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) (same). 
35 It is often suggested, for example, that legislators and their constituents are almost always 
hostile to the interests of criminal suspects and defendants. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, “Perspec-
tives on the Fourth Amendment” (1974) 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, at 378-79; Kent Roach, Due Process 
and Victims’ Rights: The New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1999); William J. Stuntz, “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law” (2001) 100 Mich. L. 
Rev. 505, at 553-56; Donald A. Dripps, “Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of 
Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?” (1993) 
44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1079; Don Stuart, “Time to Recodify Criminal Law and Rise Above Law and 
Order Expediency: Lessons from the Manitoba Warriors Prosecution” (2000) 28 Man. L.J. 89. 
36 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduc-
tion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Maxwell L. Stearns, ed., Public Choice and 
Public Law: Readings and Commentary (Cincinnati: Anderson, 1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
“Dynamic Statutory Interpretation” (1987) 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, at 1530. 
37 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1980); Rosalind Dixon, “The Supreme Court of Canada, Charter Dialogue, 
270 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Second, legislatures are better placed than courts to amass the infor-
mation necessary for optimal, prospective regulation of complex sys-
tems.38 Courts, by contrast, lack specialized expertise in the subject 
matter, are limited in their ability to call upon relevant social science and 
other “social facts”,39 and can only regulate in a piecemeal fashion in 
response to the cases that come before them.40 
Third, while legislators and judges undoubtedly suffer from the same 
cognitive biases afflicting everyone,41 the retrospective and case-specific 
nature of adjudication heightens the distorting effects of hindsight bias.42 
Courts encounter only a tiny proportion of the population of innocent 
people harmed by investigative intrusions. Thankfully, such persons are 
rarely charged and even more rarely tried. And as mentioned, few seek 
redress for this harm in civil court. As a consequence, the overwhelming 
majority of criminal defendants harmed by police are factually guilty. 
Hindsight bias inclines courts to conclude that these harms were justified 
in the circumstances.43 This leads courts to articulate flexible rules 
                                                                                                             
and Deference” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 235, at 257-66; Thomas W. Merrill, “Does Public 
Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?” (1997) 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 219; Frank 
B. Cross, “Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights” (2000) 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529; 
Michael C. Dorf & Michael Isaacharff, “Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?” (2001) 72 U. Colo. 
L. Rev. 923; Michael J. Klarman, “The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory” (1991) 77 
Va. L. Rev. 747, at 763-68. 
38 See Adrian Vermeule, Law and the Limits of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008); Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and 
Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); R. v. Landry, [1986] S.C.J. No. 10, 
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 145, at 187-88 (S.C.C.), La Forest J., dissenting; R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, 
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at para. 4 (S.C.C.), La Forest J., concurring. 
39 See Stephen Breyer, “Our Democratic Constitution” (2002) 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 245, at 
261-63; Orin S. Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution” (2004) 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, at 875-76 [hereinafter “Kerr, ‘Fourth 
Amendment’”]; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, “Interpretations and Institutions” (2003) 101 
Mich. L. Rev. 885, at 903-904, 923 [hereinafter “Sunstein & Vermeule”]; William J. Stuntz, 
Accountable Policing (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 130, 2006), available online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=886170>. 
40 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, “Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing 
Facts and the Appellate Process” (1999) 78 Tex. L. Rev. 269. 
41 Like other decision-makers (including judges), the rationality of legislators (and the 
people who elect them) is limited by many factors, including incomplete and asymmetric informa-
tion, bounded rationality and systemic psychological distortions. See, generally, Cass R. Sunstein, 
ed., Behavioral Law and Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) [hereinafter 
“Sunstein, Behavioral Law”]. 
42 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, “A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight” in 
Sunstein, Behavioral Law, id., 95. 
43 See Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue”, supra, note 3, at 57-58; Carol S. Steiker, 
“Second Thoughts About First Principles” (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820, at 852-53; Brent Snook et 
al., “Reforming Investigative Interviewing in Canada” (2010) 52 Can. J. Criminology & Crim. Just. 
203, at 206 [hereinafter “Snook et al.”]. 
(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) POLICE QUESTIONING IN THE CHARTER ERA 271 
facilitating conviction but providing suboptimal deterrence against police 
misconduct. As mentioned, legislators often follow public opinion in 
enacting “tough on crime” legislation. But they can also be sensitive to 
the effect of intrusive state powers on innocent, “ordinary” citizens. So 
when they do act to regulate the investigative process, either on their 
own initiative or in response to court decisions, they often clearly delimit 
police power and provide meaningful sanctions for overreaching.44 
Recognizing the benefits of having both institutions participate in 
shaping the law of detention and search, many jurists have thus called on 
courts to refuse to recognize common law police powers — thus spurring 
Parliament to act.45 This is possible because, prima facie, people have 
constitutional rights to not be detained or searched. At a minimum, any 
intrusion constituting a “search or seizure” under section 8 of the 
Charter46 or a “detention” under section 947 must be authorized by statute 
or common law. So, if the courts refuse to recognize common law 
powers permitting such intrusions, police may not commit them without 
legislative sanction. 
Unfortunately, this strategy is unlikely to work for police question-
ing. As mentioned, there is no statutory or constitutional right to not be 
questioned by police. In theory, the courts could erect common law or 
constitutional rules that would demand a legislative response. They could 
amend the confessions rule, for example, to exclude all admissions to 
persons in authority regardless of voluntariness, signalling to Parliament 
that it must regulate interrogation. Or in the absence of statutory rules 
regarding the invocation or waiver of the right to counsel, they could 
issue a prophylactic rule under section 10(b) of the Charter requiring a 
lawyer’s presence for questioning.48 But such innovations would repre-
sent dramatic departures from existing law as well as from deeply rooted 
conventions regarding the respective functions of courts and legislatures. 
Declining to recognize a common law police power, in contrast, is 
                                                                                                             
44 See Kerr, “Fourth Amendment”, supra, note 39, at 839-58; Steven Penney, “Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: An Economic Approach” (2007) J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 477, at 503-505; Craig Lerner, “Legislators as the ‘American Criminal Class’: 
Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants” (2004) U. Ill. L. Rev. 599, at 613-18; 
Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue, id., at 63-70. 
45 See works cited, supra, note 3. 
46 See Hunter v. Southam (sub nom. Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of 
Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.), [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 426 (S.C.C.). 
47 See R. v. Grant, [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at para. 54 (S.C.C.). 
48 See, generally, Michael Plaxton, “In Search of Prophylactic Rules” (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 
127 [hereinafter “Plaxton”]. 
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consistent with the courts’ accepted role in protecting constitutional 
liberties, leaving Parliament room to authorize reasonable invasions of 
those liberties. Nor is it likely that Parliament will choose of its own 
accord to regulate in the field. It has had well over a century to do so, and 
apart from the specialized realm of young persons, it has not done so.49 
What is possible, however, is that if courts adopt the more boldly 
regulatory approach to questioning that I urge below, Parliament might 
be impelled to regulate in a way that accords better with its own policy 
preferences. In this way, a productive dialogic relationship between 
courts and the legislature could yet emerge, maximizing the advantages 
and minimizing the disadvantages of each institution’s rule-making 
process.50 But even if this does not occur, the law of police questioning 
would still benefit from the courts’ attempts to compensate for legislative 
silence. 
IV. HOW COURTS CAN COMPENSATE FOR LEGISLATIVE SILENCE 
To illustrate what a more boldly regulatory approach to police ques-
tioning might look like, I will survey some of the key rules deriving from 
the common law confessions rule and section 10(b) of the Charter. In 
relation to each of these rules, the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted 
a largely adjudicative approach; that is, it has set out broad standards 
enabling trial courts to make fine-grained, fact-based, ex post decisions 
achieving a just result in the cases before them. I argue that the chief 
goals of police questioning law — maximizing the availability of reliable 
evidence of guilt and minimizing wrongful convictions based on false 
confessions — would be better served by adopting a legislatively 
inspired, regulatory approach; that is, the setting out of bright-line, ex 
ante rules grounded on empirical evidence. My aim is not to propose a 
comprehensive set of optimal rules, but rather to provide examples of 
how appellate judges could better approach the rule-making task. 
Before examining the jurisprudence, I should address two prelimi-
nary objections. The first relates to institutional competency. After 
highlighting the deficiencies of judicial rule-making, it might seem 
strange that I am calling for judges to adopt a role that they may not be 
well suited for. Could an assertive, reformist approach by the courts in 
                                                                                                             
49 For an explanation for why legislatures are often reluctant to legislate in criminal law, see 
Dan M. Kahan, “Is Chevron Relevant to Criminal Law?” (1996) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469, at 474-75. 
50 See Stribopoulos, “Limits”, supra, note 3, at 318-23. 
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this field make the situation worse, rather than better?51 There are several 
responses to this charge. The first is to recognize that judicial regulation 
is a second-best alternative. Since Parliament has been unwilling to act, 
legal reform can only come from the courts. Second, as mentioned and as 
described more fully below, Parliament retains a considerable capacity to 
correct what it sees as judicial errors, should it choose to do so. And 
third, in the realm of police questioning, there is reason to think that 
courts are capable of mitigating their rule-making weaknesses. As 
discussed below, courts can and have drawn from empirical literature on 
interrogation and false confessions. This scholarship bears the features of 
mature and reliable science52 and coheres to a significant extent with 
long-standing judicial experience.53 And to the extent that empirical gaps 
frustrate optimal rule-making, they are no more likely to be filled by 
legislative inquiry than litigation.54 
The second objection relates to the style of rule-making in question. 
There is a long-standing debate in legal theory on whether it is better for 
courts to articulate bright-line rules or flexible standards.55 Undoubtedly 
the law requires both; the optimal mix turns on the context.56 Rules are 
typically preferable to standards when judges have access to good 
information about the context of the decision, the regulated domain 
requires certainty, and the proposed rules can provide that certainty.57 As 
mentioned immediately above, courts have access to good information 
about false confessions, and there are several features of police question-
ing law that strongly militate in favour of certainty over flexibility. 
The first, which I discuss in greater detail below, is that courts fre-
quently err in assessing the reliability of confession evidence. Flexible, 
case-by-case determinations of the admissibility or weight of such 
evidence are likely to too often result in wrongful convictions. 
Second, errors prompted by the rigidity of bright-line rules are less 
likely to do harm in the context of police questioning than in other fields. 
                                                                                                             
51 See, generally, Sunstein & Vermeule, supra, note 39. 
52 See Moore & Fitzsimmons, supra, note 7, at 521. 
53 See R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 47 (S.C.C.). 
54 These gaps include reliable estimates of the frequency of wrongful convictions based on 
false confessions and the importance of confession evidence to conviction rates. See Sherrin, supra, 
note 7, at 606-17; Saul M. Kassin et al., “Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommen-
dations” (2010) 34 Law and Human Behavior 3, at 5 [hereinafter “Kassin et al.”]. 
55 See Louis Kaplow, “Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Approach” (1992) 42 Duke 
L.J. 557. 
56 See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999), at 57-60. 
57 Id., at 57. 
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If the application of a rule in a given case turns out to be too protective of 
a criminal suspect ex post (i.e., by denying police use of a method that 
might have induced a reliable confession), the loss to society’s interest in 
convicting the guilty may not be great. The weight of empirical evidence 
suggests that prophylactic exclusionary rules rarely cause wrongful 
acquittals.58 And as mentioned below, jurisdictions that have forgone 
problematic interrogation practices have experienced no reduction in 
confession rates. 
Lastly, case-by-case standards may be retained to prevent wrongful 
conviction in cases where bright-line rules could not prevent the admis-
sion of a dubiously reliable confession. There is considerable evidence, 
for example, that “vulnerable” individuals (including people who are 
young, intellectually disabled, mentally ill or have especially compliant 
personalities) may sometimes confess falsely, even in non-coercive 
circumstances.59 Courts could develop bright-line rules requiring police 
to identify and redress these vulnerabilities,60 but in some cases, the 
extent of vulnerability might not be apparent ex ante. But if vulnerabil-
ity is established at trial and exposes a significant risk of wrongful 
conviction, courts sensitive to the phenomenon can still exclude the 
confession.61 
V. THE CONFESSIONS RULE 
The confessions rule is a common law rule of evidence prohibiting 
the admission at trial of statements made by suspects to police or other 
“persons in authority” unless prosecutors prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the statements were made “voluntarily”.62 In theory, develop-
ing the rule in a regulatory vein should not be especially controversial. If 
Parliament disliked the courts’ reforms, it could overrule them. 
                                                                                                             
58 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, “Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanish-
ingly Small Social Costs” (1996) 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 500; John J. Donahue III, “Did Miranda 
Diminish Police Effectiveness?” (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1147. For a contrary view, see Paul G. 
Cassell & Richard Fowles, “Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s 
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement” (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1055. 
59 See Sherrin, supra, note 7, at 629-52; Richard A. Leo, “False Confessions: Causes, Con-
sequences and Implications” (2009) 37 J. Am. Academy Psych. & Law 332, at 335-37; Kassin et al., 
supra, note 54, at 19-22. 
60 See, e.g., Kassin et al., id. at 30-31. 
61 See R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at para. 42; Sherrin, supra, note 7; Dale E. Ives, “Pre-
venting False Confessions: Is Oickle Up to the Task?” (2007) 44 San Diego L. Rev. 477, at 480-84 
[hereinafter “Ives”]. 
62 See R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at para. 24. 
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It is true that the Supreme Court has recognized a “right to silence” 
under section 7 of the Charter that overlaps with the confessions rule,63 
but the implications of this holding are quite limited. For statements 
made to police interrogators, the Court has held, the confessions rule 
“effectively subsumes the constitutional right to silence”.64 Though 
informed by the Charter, the framework for deciding voluntariness is 
consequently still part of the common law.65 As the Court put it in R. v. 
Oickle, in developing the common law rule, courts can “offer protections 
beyond those guaranteed by the Charter”.66 While the courts would likely 
balk at any legislative attempt to either permit the admission of involun-
tary confessions or dramatically re-conceive the concept of voluntariness 
(to the accused’s detriment), Parliament would therefore have consider-
able space to regulate interrogation and dictate the conditions for the 
admission of confessions.67 
The problem, however, is that the courts have been reluctant to con-
ceive of the confessions rule as serving a regulatory function.68 As 
mentioned, it is technically a rule of evidence, not criminal procedure. It 
does not, therefore, directly regulate the conduct of police in questioning 
suspects. Any such effect is indirect, signalling to police that if they elicit 
an involuntary statement, it will be inadmissible at trial. 
The confessions rule has thus typically been articulated and applied 
malleably to achieve justice ex post, rather than regulate questioning in 
the public interest ex ante.69 This has been true even when courts have 
been most attuned to both the policy issues underlying interrogation and 
the social science available to inform that policy. 
                                                                                                             
63 See R. v. Turcotte, supra, note 4, at para. 41; R. v. Singh, supra, note 4, at paras. 34-40; R. 
v. G. (B.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 29, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475, at paras. 22, 44 (S.C.C.); R. v. Whittle, [1994] 
S.C.J. No. 69, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, at 931 (S.C.C.). See also Hamish Stewart, “The Confessions 
Rule and the Charter” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 517, at 529-34; Plaxton, supra, note 48, at para. 33; 
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Directions” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 249, at 255-56 [hereinafter “Dufraimont”]. 
64 R. v. Singh, id., at paras. 37-39. See also R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at paras. 29-31. 
65 See R. v. Oickle, id., at para. 31. 
66 Id., at para. 31. See also Hon. Justice Gary T. Trotter, “The Limits of Police Interroga-
tion: The Limits of the Charter” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 293, at 302-306 [hereinafter “Trotter”]. 
67 See Plaxton, supra, note 48, at 143-44. 
68 See, e.g., Trotter, supra, note 66, at 305 (expressing the judicial sentiment that it is “un-
realistic to expect bright lines in this area”). 
69 See Dufraimont, supra, note 63, at 259-60; Don Stuart, “Oickle: The Supreme Court’s 
Recipe for Coercive Interrogation” (2000) 36 C.R. (5th) 188, at 188-91. 
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Oickle illustrates the point. There, the Court took it upon itself to 
modernize and rationalize the confessions rule.70 It invoked the preven-
tion of wrongful convictions as the rule’s primary justification, referred 
to the role of false confessions in convicting the innocent, summarized 
the literature on the social and psychological dynamics of false confes-
sions, and suggested how the various aspects of the rule should account 
for those dynamics.71 
There is a strong argument, however, that the Court’s adjudicative 
approach fails to protect adequately against wrongful convictions. There 
are two steps to this argument. First, without clear, prophylactic rules to 
follow, interrogators will generate a significant number of false confes-
sions. And second, because police, prosecutors and judges are likely to 
overestimate their ability to distinguish between true and false confes-
sions, a significant number of false confessions will be admitted into 
evidence and contribute to wrongful convictions. 
To decide whether a statement was made voluntarily, judges must 
consider many factors, of which few are decisive. The voluntariness 
inquiry is “contextual”,72 having regard to “the entire circumstances”,73 
including the (objective) nature of the tactics used by police and the 
suspect’s (subjective) reaction to those tactics.74 If police are uncertain 
as to whether certain methods are permitted, they are less likely to act 
with restraint.75 Faced with a recalcitrant suspect and a serious crime, 
they may push the envelope, hoping that a court will later decide that, 
considering all the circumstances, the confession is sufficiently reliable. 
Consider the category of “threats or promises”. We know that the 
use or threat of physical violence76 and concrete offers of lenient treat-
                                                                                                             
70 R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at para. 32. See also Edmund Thomas, “Lowering the Stan-
dard: R. v. Oickle and the Confessions Rule in Canada” (2005) 10 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 69 [hereinafter 
“Thomas”]. 
71 R. v. Oickle, id., at paras. 34-45. 
72 Id., at para. 71. 
73 Id., at para. 68. 
74 See R. v. Hodgson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 66, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 449, at para. 15 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Fitton, [1956] S.C.J. No. 70, [1956] S.C.R. 958, at 962 (S.C.C.); R. v. Spencer, [2007] S.C.J. No. 11, 
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 500, at paras. 13, 21 (S.C.C.); R. v. Oickle, id., at para. 42. 
75 See, generally, Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Demo-
cratic Society (New York: MacMillan, 1994), at 12. 
76 R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at para. 48 (“obviously imminent threats of torture will ren-
der a confession inadmissible”). Not surprisingly, the empirical record confirms that violence and 
threats of violence are apt to produce false confessions. See Wayne T. Westling, “Something is 
Rotten in the Interrogation Room: Let’s Try Video Oversight” (2001) 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 537, at 
543. 
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ment77 will always result in exclusion. Few other techniques, however, 
are prohibited outright. Courts have admitted confessions despite the use 
of a variety of manipulative inducements, including offering psychiatric 
counselling;78 threatening to investigate, question or charge suspects’ 
loved ones;79 withholding contact with loved ones;80 minimizing the 
moral (as opposed to legal) seriousness of the offence;81 and suggesting 
that “it would be better” if the suspect confessed.82 
In Oickle, the Court intimated that quid pro quo inducements should 
usually result in exclusion.83 It later held in R. v. Spencer,84 however, that 
“while a quid pro quo is an important factor in establishing the existence 
of a threat or promise, it is the strength of the inducement, having regard 
to the particular individual and his or her circumstances, that is to be 
considered in the overall contextual analysis”.85 Police clearly offered 
Spencer a quid pro quo (withholding a visit with his girlfriend until he 
confessed), but considering his savvy and experience in dealing with 
police, the Court upheld the trial judge’s decision that his confession was 
voluntary.86 
The category of “oppression” is also fraught with indeterminacy. In 
Oickle, the Court noted that such conditions may be created by depriving 
suspects of necessities such as food, clothing, water, sleep or medical 
attention; denying them access to counsel; subjecting them to aggressive, 
intimidating or prolonged questioning; or confronting them with inad-
missible or fabricated evidence.87 Failing to warn suspects about their 
                                                                                                             
77 See R. v. Oickle, id., at para. 49. See also R. v. T. (S.G.), [2008] S.J. No. 572, 2008 SKCA 
119 (Sask. C.A.), revd [2010] S.C.J. No. 20, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) (statement ruled 
involuntary after police told accused that he might not be charged if he apologized). 
78 R. v. Oickle, id., at paras. 50, 78 (suggestions that the suspect needed “professional help” 
were acceptable because they did not constitute an offer contingent on a confession).  
79 See R. v. Oickle, id., at paras. 81-84 (threat to question fiancée); R. v. Spencer, supra, 
note 74 (threat to charge girlfriend). 
80 R. v. Spencer, id. 
81 R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at paras. 73-77. 
82 The Supreme Court has stated that such comments require exclusion “only where the 
circumstances reveal an implicit threat or promise”; otherwise they will likely be considered only 
“moral inducements” that do not undermine voluntariness: R. v. Oickle, id., at paras. 55, 79-80. See 
also R. v. Mujku, [2011] O.J. No. 284, 2011 ONCA 64, at paras. 33-35 (Ont. C.A.). 
83 R. v. Oickle, id., at para. 57 (“The most important consideration in all cases is to look for 
a quid pro quo offer by interrogators, regardless of whether it comes in the form of a threat or a 
promise.”). 
84 Supra, note 74. 
85 Id., at para. 15 (emphasis added). See also R. v. Jackson, [1977] B.C.J. No. 1117, 34 
C.C.C. (2d) 35, at 38 (B.C.C.A.). 
86 R. v. Spencer, id., at paras. 13, 20-21. 
87 Id., at paras. 60-61. 
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right to silence and ignoring invocations of this right may also contribute 
to an oppressive atmosphere.88 
However, none of these factors is determinative and the case law re-
veals little consistency. Courts have found confessions to be voluntary, 
for example, despite substantial sleep89 and clothing deprivations;90 
lengthy and repetitive questioning;91 repeated denials of suspects’ desire 
to remain silent;92 unlawful or unreasonably lengthy detentions;93 or 
confronting suspects with false evidence of their guilt.94 
Since Oickle, empirical evidence has continued to mount that many 
of these tactics (including many used in the “Reid Technique” used by 
most Canadian interrogators95) are apt to produce false confessions.96 
Detailed and comprehensive accounts of the relationship between 
common interrogation practices and false confessions may be found 
                                                                                                             
88 R. v. Singh, supra, note 4, at paras. 32, 53. See also R. v. Otis, [2000] J.Q. no 4320, 151 
C.C.C. (3d) 416, at para. 56 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2000] C.S.C.R. no 640, [2001] 1 
S.C.R. xvii (S.C.C.). 
89 See, e.g., R. v. Ross, [1997] O.J. No. 2316, 30 O.T.C. 247 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (oppression 
did not arise from the police’s refusal to allow an exhausted accused sleep during questioning). 
90 See, e.g., R. v. Jackson, [2005] A.J. No. 1726, 2005 ABCA 430 (Alta. C.A.). But see R. v. 
Moore-McFarlane, [2001] O.J. No. 4646, 56 O.R. (3d) 737, at para. 73 (Ont. C.A.) (lack of clothing 
one of several factors raising doubt as to voluntariness). 
91 See, e.g., R. v. Singh, supra, note 4, at para. 47. 
92 See, e.g., R. v. Singh, id. (repeated questioning in face of 18 assertions of right to silence 
did not render confession involuntary); R. v. Edmondson, [2005] S.J. No. 256, 2005 SKCA 51 (Sask. 
C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 273 (S.C.C.). 
93 See, e.g., R. v. Roy, [2003] O.J. No. 4252, 15 C.R. (6th) 282, at para. 13 (Ont. C.A.). 
94 See, e.g., R. v. Sinclair, [2003] B.C.J. No. 3258, 2003 BCSC 2040, at para. 136 
(B.C.S.C.), affd [2010] S.C.J. No. 35, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 310 (S.C.C.) (finding confession voluntary 
despite substantial “exaggerations” and “misinformation” about forensic and other evidence). 
95 The Reid Technique is a proprietary interviewing method marketed by firm John E. Reid 
and Associates. See Fred E. Inbau et al., Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 4th ed. (Boston: 
Jones and Bartlett, 2004). On the use of the Reid Technique by Canadian police see: Moore & 
Fitzsimmons, supra, note 7, at 534-36; Snook et al., supra, note 43, at 217-19. For judicial 
commentary, see: R. v. Cruz, [2008] A.J. No. 559, 2008 ABPC 155, at para. 106 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. 
v. Minde, [2003] A.J. No. 1184, at para. 32, 343 A.R. 371 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Barrett, [1993] O.J. No. 
1317, 13 O.R. (3d) 587, at para. 58 (Ont. C.A.), revd [1995] S.C.J. No. 19, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 752 
(S.C.C.); R. v. Whalen, [1999] O.J. No. 3488, at paras. 11-15 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Barges, [2005] O.J. 
No. 5595, [2005] O.T.C. 1116, at paras. 52-53, 80-81 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. S. (M.J.), [2000] A.J. No. 
391, 32 C.R. (5th) 378, at paras. 18-24, 38-50 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Chapple, 2012 ABPC 229, at 
paras. 61-73 (Alta. Prov. Ct.). 
96 See Kassin et al., supra, note 54; Steve Drizin & Richard A. Leo, “The Problem of False 
Confessions in the Post-DNA World” (2004) 82 N.C.L. Rev. 891 [hereinafter “Drizin & Leo”]; Saul 
M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, “The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and 
Issues” (2004) 5 Psychol. Sci. in Pub. Int. 33, at 55 [hereinafter “Kassin & Gudjonsson”]; Richard J. 
Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, “The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action” 
(1997) 74 Den. U.L. Rev. 979, at 1084-88 [hereinafter “Ofshe & Leo”]; Melissa B. Russano et al., 
“Investigating True and False Confessions within a Novel Experimental Paradigm” (2005) 16 
Psychological Science 481, at 484. 
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elsewhere.97 It will suffice here to highlight three tactics that have 
frequently been found to be associated with false confessions. 
The first is the presentation of false evidence, a tactic used in a high 
proportion of documented false confession cases.98 Decades of psycho-
logical research has demonstrated that misinformation can powerfully 
alter people’s perceptions and beliefs, and many experiments have shown 
that participants presented with false evidence are more likely to falsely 
confess than those who have not.99 As the Court noted in Oickle, such 
evidence “is often crucial in convincing the suspect that protestations of 
innocence, even if true, are futile”.100 Yet the Court declined to prohibit 
the practice, and in subsequent cases courts have found confessions to be 
voluntary even where police confronted the suspect with utterly fabri-
cated evidence.101 
The second tactic is the use of inducements to confess, including 
suggestions that a confession will confer leniency or another tangible 
benefit.102 As mentioned, tangible offers of leniency will likely render a 
confession involuntary, but more subtle (or in the case of Spencer, not-
so-subtle) inducements are often permitted. The evidence suggests, 
however, that statements suggesting leniency by “pragmatic implication” 
are capable of inducing false confessions.103 
A third practice commonly associated with false confessions is pro-
longed and persistent interrogation.104 Psychological studies indicate that 
suspects subjected to such questioning may confess falsely in order to 
end the ordeal,105 especially when deprived of sleep.106 In Oickle, the 
Court acknowledged that false confessions can be produced by pro-
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longed questioning.107 But it set no ex ante limit on the length of an 
interrogation, stating only that lengthy questioning was one factor 
capable of producing an atmosphere of oppression leading to an involun-
tary statement. Indeed, the interrogation approved in that case lasted 
nearly six hours. 
The evidence is strong, then, that despite the possibility of exclusion 
under the confessions rule, police continue to question suspects in ways 
apt to produce false confessions. This is in itself a significant concern, 
since people who confess falsely face a high probability of wrongful 
arrest, wrongful detention and wrongful prosecution. Even worse, of 
course, is the prospect of wrongful conviction. To avoid this, courts must 
have the capacity to discern and disregard false confessions. The option 
of leaving the weight of dubiously reliable confessions to be decided by 
the trier of fact is exceptionally dangerous. Courts have long recognized 
that triers of fact have great difficulty discounting the weight of confes-
sions, even those obtained in circumstances casting obvious doubt on 
their reliability.108 The modern empirical record amply supports this 
belief.109 
The main safeguard against false confession-based wrongful convic-
tions is therefore evidentiary exclusion, chiefly through the confessions 
rule. That rule can only be effective in preventing wrongful convictions, 
however, if there is a reliable record of all the circumstances relevant to 
the interrogation. Historically, the ability of courts to assess the reliability 
of confessions was greatly hampered by the evidentiary record. The 
testimony of defendants and police often diverged, with such “swearing 
contests” typically being won by police.110 Highly coercive interrogation 
practices consequently often went undetected. 
Today, many interrogations are electronically recorded, often with 
both video and audio.111 As the Court noted in Oickle, this is a laudable 
                                                                                                             
107 R. v. Oickle, supra, note 53, at paras. 45, 60. 
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University Press, 2008), at 195-98, 246-68; Kassin, supra, note 105, at 222-23; G. Daniel Lassiter & 
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development.112 However, the Court refused to make electronic recording 
a prerequisite (where feasible) for admissibility.113 This is unfortunate. As 
so many commentators have argued, mandatory audio-visual recording 
(of both interrogators and suspects) is a critical prophylactic against 
wrongful convictions and carries few (if any) downsides.114 An increas-
ing number of legislatures115 and courts116 have adopted some form of 
mandatory recording rule. Canadian courts should do the same.117 
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But having access to an accurate record of the interrogation is no 
panacea. Psychologists have long known that ordinary people overesti-
mate their capacity to detect deception.118 More recently, researchers 
have shown that justice system professionals display similar over-
confidence and have great difficulty discerning true from false confes-
sions.119 There is little reason to think that judges are immune from this 
deficiency. 
Further, a high proportion of documented false confessions have in-
cluded details that prosecutors have convincingly argued that an innocent 
person could not have known.120 Interrogators may (often unintention-
ally) feed or leak non-public details to suspects, and evidence of such 
contamination may either not appear or be ignored at trial, especially if 
the entire course of the interrogation is not recorded.121 The apparent 
truthfulness of such confessions may lead judges to admit (and triers of 
fact to believe) them despite the presence of factors associated with false 
confessions.122 
For all of these reasons, any regulatory regime relying primarily on 
ex post review is unlikely to mitigate the risk of wrongful conviction to 
an acceptable level. How then would a regulatory approach improve this 
situation? First and foremost, it would provide greater clarity to police on 
what they are allowed and not allowed to do in questioning suspects. 
Great strides have been made in recent years in determining the causes of 
false confessions and identifying the circumstances in which they are apt 
to lead to wrongful convictions. There is still uncertainty as to the 
frequency of false confession-based wrongful convictions, and debate 
over how far the law should go to prevent them.123 But armed with better 
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insights as to the psycho-social causes of the phenomenon and the 
limitations of the confessions rule in addressing it, courts should be able 
to craft rules that would diminish the risk of wrongful conviction without 
substantially compromising the state’s ability to convict the guilty. The 
guiding principle should be to prohibit, or at least severely restrict, the 
use of tactics that experience and science have shown are apt to produce 
false confessions, not merely to exclude only confessions that appear to 
be unreliable in a given case.124 This approach avoids the pitfalls of 
biased ex post review referred to above. 
The aim of this paper is to encourage courts to develop a regulatory 
approach to interrogation law, not to propose a comprehensive set of 
reforms to the confessions rule to minimize false confessions.125 But 
potential reforms could include (in addition to an audio-visual recording 
requirement) imposing maximum limits on the duration126 and minimum 
standards on the conditions127 of interrogations; restricting the question-
ing of vulnerable suspects;128 banning the use of false evidence;129 and 
prohibiting specific types misrepresentations as to the strength of 
evidence.130 The Supreme Court of Canada should also consider revers-
ing Spencer131 and forbid all inducements to confess, regardless of the 
perceived capacity of suspects to resist such inducements.132 Empirical 
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research confirms what judges have long intuited: threats and promises 
are the most frequent cause of false confessions.133 
The proposals would inevitably generate controversy, especially 
among police, prosecutors and others who would fear that police would 
be handicapped in their ability to obtain reliable confessions necessary to 
prove serious crimes. Experimental evidence134 and the experience of 
other jurisdictions suggests,135 however, that less confrontational and 
manipulative interrogation tactics are at least as adept at obtaining 
reliable confessions as the harsher techniques more commonly used in 
Canada and the United States. 
VI. SECTION 10(b) OF THE CHARTER 
In the United States, dissatisfaction with the confession rule’s effec-
tiveness in curbing coercive interrogation practices led the Supreme 
Court to adopt the Miranda warnings under the aegis of the Fifth 
Amendment’s self-incrimination clause.136 Canada’s version of Miranda 
is section 10(b) of the Charter, which states that “[e]veryone has the right 
on arrest or detention ... to retain and instruct counsel without delay and 
to be informed of that right”. In interpreting this simple directive, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has issued an elaborate set of rules that is in 
some ways a model of the kind of prospective regulatory regime pro-
posed here. As detailed below, however, many of these rules are too 
imprecise to provide substantial protection against false confessions. 
Before elaborating this argument, I should address two potential ob-
jections. First, courts have not said that minimizing false confessions is 
one of section 10(b)’s purposes. Instead, its purpose is to help suspects 
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make informed, voluntary choices in their interactions with police.137 The 
right to counsel, the Supreme Court has held, gives suspects the opportu-
nity to become more aware of their legal situation and mitigates the risk 
of unwitting self-incrimination.138 However, in better equipping detainees 
to resist pressure to confess, section 10(b) does indirectly help to mini-
mize false confessions.139 As mentioned, questioning techniques apt to 
produce false confessions are most likely to be used with detainees who 
do not give police the answers they are looking for. Section 10(b) tells 
such persons that they have the right to cut off questioning and talk to a 
lawyer. It also reminds police that there are “moral and constitutional 
limits” to their efforts to extract confessions.140 Even if section 10(b) 
is not directly aimed at reducing false confessions, assessing whether 
a regulatory approach can better enhance this goal is still a worthy 
exercise. 
The second objection relates to section 10(b)’s constitutional status. 
In theory, it is much more difficult to amend rules promulgated by the 
courts under the Charter than the common law. The difference may not 
be as great in practice, however. As mentioned, the confessions rule has 
been constitutionalized in the sense that courts would likely strike down 
any statute diminishing its core protections. But consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s dialogic approach to Charter review,141 legislation more 
modestly modifying or augmenting the rule would likely be treated with 
deference. A similar dynamic would likely emerge should Parliament 
legislate on the right to counsel during interrogation. In recent years, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has been willing to approve of substantial 
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legislative modifications of rules that it had previously promulgated as 
constitutional minimum standards.142 
In much of its early section 10(b) jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
did impose several bright-line obligations and prohibitions on police. In 
concert with the Court’s now-abandoned, near-automatic exclusionary 
rule for self-incriminating evidence,143 these rules set the framework for 
a robust regulatory approach to the right to counsel. Recall that the only 
express obligation on police contained in section 10(b) is to tell detainees 
that they have a right to talk to a lawyer. But under the Court’s “pur-
posive” interpretive approach, police must also inform detainees of any 
available legal aid or duty counsel services.144 Further, if duty counsel is 
available, police must tell detainees how to contact them.145 And when 
detainees do assert their right to counsel, police must allow them, as soon 
as feasibly possible,146 to telephone a lawyer in private.147 Police may not 
elicit any evidence from the detainee before such access is provided.148 
But many other section 10(b) rules hew more closely to the adjudica-
tive approach. Particularly opaque is the threshold determination of 
whether a person has been detained and is therefore entitled to the right 
to counsel. The governing test in most interrogation cases is whether the 
“reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances would conclude that 
he or she had been deprived by the state of the liberty of choice”, 
considering the “circumstances giving rise to the encounter as would 
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reasonably be perceived by the individual”, “[t]he nature of the police 
conduct”, the “particular characteristics or circumstances of the individ-
ual”, as well as a non-exhaustive list of considerations falling within 
these categories.149 
There are many problems with this test.150 I focus here on those relat-
ing to false confessions. The Court in Grant likely intended that poten-
tially coercive, interrogation-style questioning trigger the protection of 
section 10(b). Several of the Grant factors, including whether police 
have singled out the suspect for “focussed investigation”, the “duration 
of the encounter” and the “language used” by police, seem directed to 
this end.151 Yet no factor is decisive, and even intensive interrogation 
may not always trigger detention if police tell suspects that they are free 
to leave. The Court in Grant stated that in “those situations where the 
police may be uncertain whether their conduct is having a coercive effect 
on the individual, it is open to them to inform the subject in unambiguous 
terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free 
to go”.152 Before Grant, most courts had found detention when police 
had identified the accused as the likely perpetrator and conducted 
questioning with a view to inducing self-incriminating statements, even 
when suspects were told that they were free to leave or to decline 
answering questions.153 But since Grant, some have held otherwise.154 
Given the psychological dynamics of intensive interrogation, even 
repeated references to the freedom to leave may not be heeded, espe-
cially by innocent suspects eager to clear their names.155 A simpler rule 
finding detention whenever police try to elicit self-incriminating infor-
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mation from someone they have identified as a likely perpetrator of the 
offence would provide clearer guidance to police and better mitigate the 
risk of false confession.156 
Another minefield of indeterminacy is the jurisprudence surrounding 
the duration and circumstances of the “reasonable opportunity” afforded 
to detainees who have invoked their right to counsel.157 For the duration 
of this period, police must refrain from questioning or otherwise attempt-
ing to elicit self-incriminating evidence from detainees.158 Once the 
“reasonable opportunity” expires, however, police may proceed with such 
measures, regardless of whether detainees have talked to a lawyer.159 
Most of the litigation in this area arises when a detainee expresses a 
desire to talk to a specific lawyer, is not able to contact him or her, and is 
then questioned. Sometimes detainees will not have spoken to any 
lawyer; in others they may have consulted with either duty counsel or 
another lawyer. The Supreme Court has held that detainees have a 
presumptive right to talk to a lawyer of their choosing, but must be 
reasonably diligent in doing so.160 The cases on this issue are notoriously 
inconsistent.161 As one would expect of the adjudicative approach, there 
are few hard and fast rules: in each case, “all of the surrounding circum-
stances” must be considered in deciding whether police have provided a 
reasonable opportunity; or conversely, whether detainees have diligently 
exercised their rights.162 
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A related rule requires police to issue an additional caution (often 
called a “Prosper warning”) to detainees who, after invoking their right 
to talk to a lawyer, decide not to do so.163 In such cases, police must defer 
questioning until detainees clearly and knowingly waive their right to 
counsel. This requires police to remind detainees that they are entitled to 
a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel, during which the police are 
prohibited from obtaining incriminating evidence.164 This rule is clear 
enough, but several courts have found that the warning need not be given 
to detainees who have not been reasonably diligent in attempting to 
contact counsel.165 It thus requires police to again decide, on the totality 
of circumstances, whether the detainee has been duly diligent. 
A regulatory perspective points to a much narrower construal of the 
right to counsel of choice. In most cases, detainees will be able to speak 
to duty counsel immediately. Where such consultation is available, 
detainees who express a desire to talk to a specific lawyer should be 
given a brief and definite period of time to do so (e.g., one hour). If 
detainees have not talked to this lawyer within that period, they should 
be given the chance to speak with duty counsel. If they decline that 
opportunity, police should be obliged to issue the Prosper warning before 
questioning them. If neither preferred nor duty counsel is available, 
police will have to hold off until one of them is, unless detainees give a 
valid Prosper waiver. 
This approach would be simple for police to administer and would 
have the happy effects of increasing the availability of reliable confes-
sion evidence (leading to just convictions), minimizing the frequency of 
false confessions (leading to wrongful convictions), and in some cases, 
shortening the duration of detention. 
The goal of obtaining just convictions would be fostered in two 
ways. First, it would assist the police in conducting timely and efficient 
investigations. The due diligence rule’s purpose is to prevent dilatory 
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detainees from frustrating police efforts to obtain reliable evidence.166 
Where duty counsel is available, shortening the “reasonable opportunity” 
period to one hour (or another brief period) would further enhance this 
purpose. In some cases, this would generate reliable evidence that would 
not have otherwise been obtainable. 
Second, under the current rule, the uncertainty of the due diligence 
standard will often cause inadvertent Charter violations. Courts will find 
that police should have either given detainees more time to contact their 
lawyers or given them a Prosper warning. In many of these cases, 
reliable confession evidence will be excluded as a result. This would be 
an acceptable cost if exclusion were necessary to encourage compliance 
with a rule protecting against wrongful convictions. But as explained 
immediately below, the current expansive interpretation of the right to 
counsel of choice does not advance these interests. 
Indeed, the approach I propose is more likely to prevent false confes-
sions than the current one. Under the reasonable opportunity rule, 
detainees who wish to talk to counsel but are not duly diligent are 
entitled to neither consultation nor a Prosper warning. Having indicated 
a reluctance to talk to police without legal advice, they are nonetheless 
subjected to the rigours of interrogation without the benefit of that 
advice. If talking to a lawyer helps the innocent to resist pressure to 
confess, that assistance is lost. My proposal, in contrast, would ensure 
that all detainees who want to talk to a lawyer actually do so, unless they 
later exercise a voluntary and informed waiver. 
In at least some cases, this approach would also lessen the duration 
of detainees’ detentions. Because the “reasonable opportunity” period 
would be short, police could proceed with interrogation sooner than is 
the case today. This would spur earlier release if, after the interrogation, 
police decide to: decline to arrest a detainee; release an arrestee; or 
promptly present an arrestee to a justice for potential pre-trial release. 
It might be argued that an even better approach would be to allow 
detainees more time to talk to lawyers of their choosing. In my view, this 
would frustrate the efficiency of interrogation and prolong detention 
without significantly minimizing the risk of false confession. While the 
advice given to detainees may vary, there is no evidence that duty 
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counsel’s advice is less protective than that of other lawyers.167 Lawyers 
acting as duty counsel are ethically obliged to provide competent and 
comprehensive advice, and organizations that deliver duty counsel 
services bear a responsibility to ensure proper training, supervision and 
oversight. In any case, since under the current regime most detainees 
who invoke their rights to talk to duty counsel, preserving a robust right 
to counsel of choice would add little protection against false confessions. 
No doubt, some detainees feel more comfortable consulting lawyers 
whom they know. If they are able to talk to them within a brief and 
certain period of time, they should be permitted to do so. But in the 
absence of evidence that trust or confidence in a particular lawyer 
mitigates the risk of false confessions, we would be better off with a 
regime that ensures both prompt consultation and prompt interrogation. 
There is, however, an alternative that would be even simpler to ad-
minister and offer even more protection against false confessions: a rule 
prohibiting incommunicado questioning after the assertion of the right to 
counsel. In the United States under Miranda, once detainees invoke their 
right to counsel, police must cease questioning until a lawyer is pre-
sent.168 This rule applies regardless of whether detainees have talked to a 
lawyer or attempted (whether diligently or not) to do so.169 
The advantages of this approach are obvious. Talking to a lawyer 
does not guarantee that detainees will be able to resist pressure to confess 
falsely.170 As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the prohibi-
tion on post-invocation questioning is “designed to prevent police from 
badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda 
rights”.171 For detainees who invoke their rights (admittedly a minority of 
all detainees), such a rule would dramatically diminish the risk of false 
confession. But it would also come with a cost: reducing the availability 
of reliable confession evidence. Whether the benefits would outweigh the 
costs entails a difficult policy choice. In my view they would.172 But the 
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Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision in R. v. Sinclair173 has 
foreclosed this option for the foreseeable future. There, the Court 
confirmed that police could not only question after invocation (assuming 
consultation, the expiry of the reasonable opportunity or a Prosper 
waiver), but also that they could refuse detainees’ requests to either stop 
the interrogation or (save for limited exceptions) consult again with 
counsel.174 The best option for bolstering section 10(b)’s protection 
against false confessions is thus to encourage prompt consultation with a 
lawyer, even if that means curtailing the right to counsel of choice. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Legislative inaction does not in itself give courts free rein to adopt 
the kind of regulatory approach proposed here. In many situations, a 
case-by-case incrementalist approach may still be best. But where a 
pressing policy concern presents itself, clear and prospective rules are 
needed to address that concern, and the courts have access to the empiri-
cal information required to shape those rules, the case for bright-line 
prospective regulation becomes strong. 
The law of police questioning meets each of these criteria. The pre-
vention of wrongful convictions is one of the most important goals of the 
criminal justice system.175 The evidence is mounting that false confes-
sions are not rare and often contribute to wrongful convictions. The kinds 
of clear rules necessary to substantially mitigate the problem are rela-
tively easy to discern and amply supported by the empirical record. And 
it is becoming increasingly apparent that the adoption of such rules is not 
likely to substantially hamper efforts to convict the guilty. 
Meaningful reform of police questioning will likely require more 
than legal innovation. Professional norms will also need to change (there 
are tentative signs that this may finally be starting to occur176). But the 
law can play an important role in both regulating questioning practices 
and fostering attitudinal changes among interrogators. In the absence of 
legislative action, the responsibility falls on appellate judges to take up 
this regulatory mantle. 
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